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Abstract
Social choice models usually assume that choice is among exoge-
nously given and non decomposable alternatives. Often, on the con-
trary, choice is among objects that are constructed by individuals or
institutions as complex bundles made of many interdependent com-
ponents. In this paper we present a model of object construction in
majority voting and show that, in general, by appropriate changes
of such bundles, di®erent social outcomes may be obtained, depend-
ing upon initial conditions and agenda, intransitive cycles and median
voter dominance may be made appear or disappear, and that, ¯nally,
decidability may be ensured by increasing manipulability or viceversa.
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11 Introduction
The baseline of every argument on individual and social choice is that agents
choose among exogenously given and uni-dimensional objects according to
their preferences. In this paper, we focus on and question about both the
\exogenously given" and the \uni-dimensional" hypotheses.
In particular, we study the case in which \objects", far from being un-
structured points in an abstract choice space, are composed of di®erent parts,
traits and features that can be variously instantiated and combined with one
another. Under this perspective, \objects" can be conceived of as largely
under-determined labels that stand for speci¯c compositions of the underly-
ing set of features and dimensions they are composed of. At the same time,
we ask: where do alternatives come from? In answering this question, we try
and model situations in which alternatives are endogenously constructed by
a social actor that has an \alternatives generation power" which is ful¯lled
by structuring and instantiating objects' features sets.
Three points are at stake here and de¯ne the subject of this paper. First,
as one's preferences might vary as long as the same object receives di®erent
instantiations, the power of de¯ning an object by concretely coupling and
instantiating its features' set might have a signi¯cant relevance with respect
to driving and constraining individual choice. Second, there is a wide room
for interesting trade-o®s to emerge as long as non separabilities (interdepen-
dencies) and non-monotonicities exist between di®erent features of the same
object. Third, there is an extent to which object construction can lead to spe-
ci¯c social outcomes through the selection and categorization of appropriate
traits/features sets.
Broadly speaking, our results are about choice as taking place within an
institutionally framed scenario which, at a minimum, constructs a set of al-
ternatives. We show that the very construction process is far from being
neutral neither with respect to individual choice nor to the selection of so-
cial outcomes. In particular, we de¯ne some precise tools to investigate the
relation between the possibility of aggregating individual preferences, their
structure and the existence of some centralized form of power.
Broadly speaking, our results suggest that the possibility of constructing
aggregate states is to some extent founded upon the categorization performed
by an underlying pre-choice institution.
21.1 A Toy Example
Let us consider a simple textbook example of a social choice in which a group
of friends have to decide what to do tonight.
A textbook example would normally begin by assuming a given list of
alternatives such as: going to the movies, to a discotheque, to a pub, to a
restaurant or having dinner in one's place, and by supposing that the group
of friends have well de¯ned and complete preferences over these alternatives.
However, at a closer scrutiny, one realizes that these alternatives are
grossly under-determined labels which stand for some combinations of lower
level traits. `Going to the movies' per se is far too vague and most subjects
would ¯nd it hard to express any preference about it, unless it is given a
precise content by specifying a list of elements that compose the activity of
going to the movies. Possible elements are for instance: genre, director, ac-
tors, title, theater, with whom, at what time, by which means of transport,
and so on.
Going to the movies and the other alternatives are actually multi-dimen-
sional bundles of components which are likely to possess some non standard
properties. First, the set of components is not in general partitioned by the
set of alternatives: for instance the with whom and at what time elements
are likely to appear in each of the above listed objects, a type of food element
will be part at least of the going to the restaurant object as well as of the
dinner at home one, etc.
Second, non-separabilities, which are often assumed away by classical
models because of their disturbing analytical consequences, are very likely
to be the norm when choice is among such interdependent bundles. For ex-
ample, I might prefer Italian to all other possibilities as an instantiation of
the type of food trait if we are staying at home and I am going to cook,
but on the contrary Italian food might well be one of my least preferred al-
ternatives if we are going to a restaurant and we are in Paris or London. I
might very much want Fran» coise as the only member of the with whom trait
if the outcome is t^ ete-a-t^ ete dinner, but if going to the movies is chosen then
I might be strongly in favour of watching Lars von Trier's latest masterpiece
and in that case I would rather not invite her as she would keep yawning and
complaining all the time.
Third, because of non-separabilities and context dependence, the way el-
ements are bundled together, i.e. the way objects are constructed (object
3construction power), and the order in which objects are compared (agenda
power) have in general an in°uence both on individual and on social choices.
This will be shown in the rest of paper.
Fourth, because of the combinatorial nature of objects, as soon as the
number of traits is not minuscule, an exhaustive procedure requiring to vote
on all possible combinations of traits (for instance a pairwise competition
between all conceivable couples of alternatives) cannot be completed in a
reasonable time. A feasible procedure requires that only a subset of all possi-
ble alternatives should be examined: object construction serves this purpose
by pre-de¯ning templates that guide the construction of instances of such
objects. Only instances of pre-de¯ned `legal' objects will be considered by
the choice procedure. Obviously, the more such templates are ¯nely de¯ned,
that is the fewer components each template is made of, the fewer alternatives
are examined and the more quickly a social choice can be reached. For in-
stance if every component is voted upon separately, the time needed to reach
a decision is linear in the number of components. If, on the contrary, all com-
ponents are grouped together in one object, the time required to examine all
the instances is exponential in the number of components. We will also show
that exhaustive voting procedures in which all conceivable combinations of
elements are compared are very likely to produce cycles µ a la Condorcet-Arrow
and make the social outcome indeterminate. On the contrary, if social choice
is based on objects made of a small number of components, cycles become
less likely and a social outcome can be achieved. However, in this case, many
locally optima social outcomes appear and which one is selected depends
upon the particular set of objects (object construction power) and the order
in which voting takes place (agenda power).
In this paper we attempt a preliminary investigation of this fundamental
but much neglected part of any individual and social choice process, that
is the pre-choice phase of object construction, when some agents or insti-
tutions might enjoy a pivotal role. According to this perspective, we shall
try to model how the construction of objects interacts with choices, how
choosers' preferences interact with objects construction, and, ¯nally, how
object construction may confer a power of driving and constraining social
outcomes.
The main issue at hand is that interesting dynamics can emerge from
possible clashes between di®erent ways of clustering sets of traits into wholes
and more or less separable preferences on the part of agents. Agents, for
4instance, may or may not be allowed to separately express their preferences
on single features as these may be separate objects of choice or may only
be jointly considered under a composite category. Agents might indeed have
well de¯ned preferences on the objects of their choice once objects are given
but still how objects are de¯ned and constructed is a crucial as much as a
neglected point, and since agents are compelled to choose on a given object-
like categorization of sets of features, none of their single-feature preferences
will be re°ected in their choices as such.
Our approach here focuses on the way object construction works as an in-
stitution with respect to selecting subsets of feasible outcomes. In particular,
we view an institution as essentially characterized by some power to de¯ne
on which set of objects society is called to choose upon. Our main focus is
on the relations between objects structures and individual preference struc-
tures and our main question is about the extent to which object construction
can lead to speci¯c social outcomes through the selection and bundling of
appropriate sets of features.
As a matter of fact, there appears to be a object construction analogue of
\agenda power" which is not just given by the power of setting the order in
which alternatives are voted but the power of constructing the alternatives
when the latter are bundles of di®erent traits or features. As to this point,
we ask what is the extent to which, by appropriately forming such bundles,
one can in°uence the social outcome. Further, if alternatives are bundles of
features, individual preferences might not be separable in each component
and interdependencies might show up. Or, on the contrary, agents may have
some areas of indi®erence on some features. Thus, by exploiting interdepen-
dencies and indi®erence, institutions can in°uence a social choice by selecting
a speci¯c outcome out of a multitude of possible ones.
In what follows we develop a model of majority voting whereby a plurality
of individual agents possess heterogeneous individual orderings that have to
be aggregated into collective outcomes. A well established literature shows
that the aggregation of elements into a collective choice is not always straight-
forward. Arrow (1951) shows that no universal voting procedure exists that
aggregates individual preferences into social orderings that satisfy a set of
minimal conditions. McKelvey (1979) has proven that under majority rule
the stake of agenda manipulation can encompass the entire range of feasible
outcomes however individual preferences are de¯ned. Far from being seen as
simple sums of components, aggregation processes do have the potential for
5unstable, arbitrary, intransitive and chaotic behaviour.
In our model, an institution proposes instantiations of the given objects to
agents based on its set of objects. Agents vote according to their preferences
and following the majority rule. This voting procedure may enter a cycle or
select some locally optimal outcome, depending on the initial condition, on
the sequence through which alternatives are presented, and, especially, on
how components are aggregated into objects.
We show that under general and plausible (in our setting) conditions, no-
tably if preferences on single components are not fully separable, the outcome
is highly dependent upon the set of objects. We show algorithmically that,
given a set of individual preferences, by appropriate modi¯cations of the ob-
jects we can obtain either a single global optimum or multiple local optima
or cycles. In the case of many local optima, by appropriately selecting the
starting point and, in some cases, the agenda any of the local optima can be
obtained. We also show that cycles µ a la Condorcet-Arrow (de Caritat Mar-
quis de Condorcet 1785, Arrow 1951)1 , may also appear and disappear by
appropriately modifying the objects. Finally, we also show that the median
voter property (Black 1958, Downs 1957) is dependent upon object construc-
tion: by appropriately reconstructing alternatives a winning median agent
may be transformed into an outright loser.
It is worth stressing that we show these results in a setting in which there
is a given and ¯nite set of components and in which the set of objects always
covers such a set entirely. Di®erent objects are simply Di®erent decompo-
sitions (not necessarily partitions) of such a set, and the results we obtain
show that di®erent decompositions can generate vastly di®erent outcomes.
Thus what we show is not there exist something we could call a `focussing of
attention' power, i.e. that in world in which there exist potentially in¯nite
choices to be made, a fundamental power is exerted in focussing the social
attention on some issues rather than others. In our ¯nite setting all possible
issues are always decided upon.
1This is a well known result for which even in the presence of transitive individual
preferences, social preferences expressed through some voting rule may be intransitive and
generate cycles.
61.2 Relation to Previous Literature
We believe that our model captures a neglected aspect of categorization and
framing in social choice and that building alternatives based on particular
categories confers - to some extent - the power to determine, in°uence and
direct the selection of speci¯c social outcomes. This point seems to be very
consonant in spirit with some recent work of George Lako® on the use of
frames and metaphors in politics. According to Lako® (2004):
Frames are mental structures that shape the way we see the world.
As a result, they shape the goals we seek, the plans we make, the
way we act and what counts as a good or a bad outcome of our
actions. In politics our frames shape our social policies and the
institutions we form to carry out policies. To change our frames
is to change all of this. Reframing is social change.
To our knowledge this issue of object construction has not been dealt with
by economic models. Relatively close to our perspective is the literature on
multidimensional voting models (Kramer 1972, Shepsle 1979, Denzau and
Mackay 1981). Enelow and Hinich (1983) instead consider a multi-issue case
in which each issue is voted sequentially in time and where the agenda induces
path-dependency, that might be mitigated by the agents' forecast abilities.
In particular, Shepsle (1979) presents a model of majority voting in which
institutions play a similar role to the one objects have in our own model, i.e.
that of limiting the set of outcomes that undergo examination. Two institu-
tional mechanisms are analyzed: jurisdictional restrictions { especially those
induced by decentralization and division of labour among decision making
units { and agenda limitations in the possible changes to the current sta-
tus quo. Both limit the set of attainable outcomes and equilibria (called
structure-induced equilibria) and may rule out cycles. There are at least two
important di®erences between this perspective and ours. First, the problem
tackled by these papers is essentially the one arising from the sequential in-
terdependency of voting: how we settle an issue today may change how we
prefer to settle a related issue tomorrow. In our approach instead we focus on
interdependencies generated by how elements interact within the particular
objects we are deliberating upon. Second, in Shepsle (1979) restrictions on
attainable outcomes are placed by legal and organizational rules, that de¯ne
which outcomes are attainable from the status quo, in our approach instead
restrictions are placed by the object construction process exerted by some
7agent or institution: once an object has been de¯ned all its instances are
always generated and compared.
On the grounds of the latter observation, our paper is also related to a
recent literature that has begun to analyze decision making when agents
group states of the world into coarse categories (Mullainathan 2000, Fryer
and Jackson 2008). They show, among other things, that in such circum-
stances agents can be persuaded, meaning that uninformative message may
in°uence their decisions (Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, and Shleifer 2008).
Our perspective is di®erent and complementary: our objects are not cate-
gories based on similarity among the states of the world as in these papers
but are human constructs with an internal structure of interdependencies,
di®erent from similarity.
Context-dependent voting has also been analyzed by some papers (Callander
and Wilson 2006). In these papers context-dependency refers to the violation
of the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), i.e. the as-
sumption that the preferences expressed by an agent between two outcomes
xi and xj does not depend on the presence or absence of other outcomes
in the choice set. Psychologists and marketing scholars have observed sys-
tematic violations of IIA (Kahneman and Tversky 2000). In our model we
assume a di®erent form of context dependency, meaning that preferences be-
tween two instantiations of a trait or components in general depend upon
the value taken by other traits. In the next section we argue why this form
of non-separability is very likely to happen in our context of objects made of
interdependent features.
1.3 Structure of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our formalism, which
we use in order to obtain, in section 3, some `possibility' results. We pro-
vide examples in which social outcomes depend upon object construction in
that the number and location of social optima and the presence of cycles
depend upon the set of objects. In section 4 we show that also standard
median voter results are dependent upon the pre-choice object construction
activity: we provide an example in which an appropriate choice of objects
and initial conditions determines an outcome opposite to the one preferred
by the median voter. In section 5 instead we discuss, by means of computer
simulations, the likelihood of such phenomena in randomly generated social
8decision problems. In particular we show that, in general, cycles are very
likely to appear in populations of agents with random preferences when they
are asked to vote on all possible alternatives. The likelihood of cycles can
be sharply decreased by asking agents to vote on ¯ner rather than coarser
objects. On the other hand, using ¯ner objects increases the number of local
optima and therefore the manipulability of voting. It appears that decid-
ability can be obtained only if manipulability is also increased: cycles can
be avoided and well de¯ned social outcomes can be reached (in a reasonable
time) if choices are more `structured', but this inevitably increases the power
to in°uence the social outcome of those who have the possibility to determine
such a structure. Finally, in section 6 we draw some conclusions.
2 The model
We assume that choices are made over social outcome formed by a set of n
atomic traits or components F = ff1;f2;:::;fng, each taking a value out
of a ¯nite set of possibilities. In order to simplify notation, we assume that
the cardinalities of the sets of possibilities are the same for all components
and equal to ` ¸ 2. For all components we label possibilities with integers
fi 2 f0;1;2;:::;` ¡ 1g 8i = 1;:::;n. Thus there are `n possible social
outcomes: X = fx1;x2;:::;x`ng.
There exist h individual agents A = fa1;a2;:::;ahg, each characterized
by complete individual preferences over the set of social outcomes: given any
two outcomes xi and xj an agent ak can always state whether xi Âk xj or
xj Âk xi or xi ¼k xj. We will assume that agents hold transitive preferences
and therefore that they can (weakly) order social outcomes. No further
assumption will be made on agents' preferences: any ordering will be allowed.
In particular we will assume that non-separabilities generally characterize
preferences on single components.
Individual preferences are aggregated through sincere majority voting.
Given a status quo xi and an alternative xj agents truthfully vote according
to their preferences. Agent k votes for xi if xi Âk xj, votes for xj if xj Âk xi
and abstains if xi ¼k xj. If xj obtains the majority of votes (abstentions
do not count as votes) it becomes the new status quo, otherwise xi is kept.
We make the hypothesis that this process continues until no other feasible
alternative can win against the current status quo. We write xj Â< xi if xj
defeats xi according to this procedure.
9Given an initial outcome, the majority voting rule, and a procedure for the
generation of alternatives we obtain a social choice process which can either
end up on a social optimum or cycle forever among a subset of alternatives.
A further problem may arise from the combinatorial nature of the set of
alternatives: the cardinality of the set X is exponential in the number n of
features and even for relatively small values of n the number of alternatives
may be so large that no realistically feasible voting process can possibly
examine all of them. The alternative generation mechanisms also serves the
function of narrowing down the number of alternatives to be considered,
making decision possible in a feasible time scale.
In our model, a fundamental part of the social decision is the pre-voting
generative mechanism through which alternatives are generated as instan-
tiations of pre-de¯ned objects and ultimately determines which subset of
alternatives undergoes examination. As we shall show, di®erent sets of ob-
jects may generate di®erent social outcomes because the subset of generated
alternative is di®erent (and some social optima may not belong to some of
these subsets) and because the agenda is di®erent. Object construction power
appears therefore as more general a phenomenon than agenda power.
Let I = f1;2;:::;ng be the set of indexes and let an object Ci µ I be a
non-empty subset of it, we call the size of object Ci , its cardinality jCij.
We de¯ne an objects-scheme as a set of objects:




Note that an objects-scheme does not have necessarily to be a partition as
components may belong to more than one object.
We de¯ne the size of an objects-scheme as the size of its largest object:
jCj = max fjC1j;jC2j;:::jCkjg
Given an outcome xi and an objects-scheme C, we call instantiation of
an object Cj 2 C, that we denote by xi(Cj), the substring of length jCjj







jjCjj for all jh 2 Cj
We also use the notation xi(C¡j) to indicate the part of the social outcome
of length n ¡ jCjj containing the components of xi not belonging to object
Cj.
10Two object instantiations can be united by means of the non commutative
_ operator which produces the union of the two instantiations with the ¯rst
instantiation's components where the two intersect:
x(Cj) _ y(Ch) = z(Cj [ Ch) where zº =
½
xº if º 2 Cj
yº otherwise
We can therefore write xi = xi(Cj) _ xi(C¡j) for any Cj.
An agenda ® = C®1C®2 :::C®k over the objects scheme C is a permuta-
tion of the set of objects which states the order according to which objects
are examined.
We suppose that an initial social outcome is (randomly) given2 then the
¯rst object of the agenda is considered and all object instantiations are gen-
erated. At every step agents vote the status quo against a new outcome in
which the components of the object under consideration are replaced by new
object instantiations, whereas all other objects are kept unchanged in their
initial values. Every time the outcome obtaining the majority becomes the
(new) status quo.
When all instantiations have been examined for the ¯rst object in the
agenda, the same procedure is repeated for the second, third, ..., k¡th object
in the agenda. As to the stopping rule we can consider two possibilities:
1. objects which have already been settled cannot be re-examined
2. objects which have already been settled can be re-examined and if new
social improvements have become possible
Though less realistic, we will use the latter stopping rule, as the former
does not in general lead to optimal outcomes, i.e. outcomes that cannot
be further improved by di®erent instantiations of some objects in scheme
C. Thus the agenda is repeated over again until an optimum or a cycle are
encountered.
More precisely, we will use the following algorithmic implementation of
majority voting:
1. repeat for all initial conditions x = x1 to x`n
2. repeat for all objects C®i = C®1 to C®k until a cycle or a local optimum
is found;
2In what follows we actually ¯nd properties for all possible initial social outcomes.
113. repeat for j = 1 to `jC®ij
² generate an object instantiation Cj
®i of object C®i
² vote between x and x0 = Cj
®i _ x(C¡®i)
² if x0 receives the majority of votes (without counting abstentions)
it becomes the new current outcome
Given an objects-scheme C = fC1;C2;:::;Ckg, we say that an outcome xi
is a preferred neighbour of outcome xj with respect to an object Ch 2 C
if the following three conditions hold:
1. xi Â< xj
2. xº
i = xº
j 8º = 2 Ch
3. xi 6= xj
Conditions 2 and 3 require that the two outcomes di®er only by compo-
nents belonging to object Ch. According to the de¯nition, a neighbour can
be reached from a given outcome through voting on a single object.
We call Hi(x;Ci) the set of preferred neighbours of an outcome x for
object Ci.
A path P(xi;C) from an outcome xi and for an objects-scheme C is a
sequence, starting from xi, of preferred neighbours:
P(xi;C) = xi;xi+1;xi+2;::: with xi+m+1 2 H(xi+m;C)
An outcome xj is reachable from another outcome xi and for objects-
scheme C if there exist a path P(xi;C) such that xj 2 P(xi;C).
A path can end up either on a social (local) optimum, i.e. an outcome
which does not have any preferred neighbour, or in a cycle among a set of
outcomes which are preferred neighbours to each other. The latter is the well
known case of intransitive social preferences.
The set of best neighbours Bi(x;Ci) µ Hi(x;Ci) of an outcome x for
object Ci is the set of the socially most preferred outcomes in the set of
neighbours:
Bi(x;Ci) = fy 2 Hi(x;Ci) such that y Â
< z 8z 2 Hi(x;Ci)g
12By extension from a single object to the entire objects-scheme, we can






An outcome x is a local optimum for the objects-scheme C if there does
not exist an outcome y such that y 2 H(x;C) and y Â< x.
Suppose outcome xj is a local optimum for objects-scheme C, we call
basin of attraction of xj for objects-scheme C the set of all outcomes from
which xj is reachable:
ª(xj;C) = fy; such that 9P(y;C) with xj 2 P(y;C)g
A cycle is a set X0 = fx0
1;x0
2;:::;x0





1 and that for all x 2 X0, if x has a preferred neighbour
y 2 H(x;C) then necessarily y 2 X0.
3 Objects, local optima and cycles
Having de¯ned the basic characteristics of the paths across the set of out-
comes which are generated by voting processes, we are ready to discuss their
fundamental properties. Our algorithmic approach allows to trace all the
possible paths and characterize all possible outcomes for every initial condi-
tion. We elaborate on previous work: Marengo, Pasquali, and Valente (2005)
provides a methodology for mapping every decomposition of a ¯nite and dis-
crete search space into possible outcomes in the case in which all objects
can be re-examined endlessly until no further improvements can be made,
while Page (1996) o®ers similar results in the case in which once decided
an object cannot be re-examined even if improvement become later possible.
As already mentioned, in this paper we will discuss only the more general
case in which all objects can be always re-examined until no further social
improvement whatsoever becomes possible.
In this section we show that, in general, social outcomes depend upon
the adopted objects scheme and that by appropriately modifying it one can
obtain di®erent social outcomes or even the appearance or disappearance of
intransitive cycles. In this section we provide \possibility" results, i.e. we
show examples of occurrences of such phenomena, in the next section we will
attempt a discussion of their generality and likelihood.
13We ¯rst show that, in general, di®erent objects-schemes can produce dif-
ferent social outcomes.
Consider ¯rst a very simple example in which 5 agents have a common
most preferred choice. The following table presents their individual prefer-
ences, ranked from the most to the least preferred outcome:
Order Agent1 Agent2 Agent3 Agent4 Agent5
1st 011 011 011 011 011
2nd 111 000 010 101 111
3rd 000 001 001 111 000
4th 010 110 101 110 010
5th 100 010 000 100 001
6th 110 111 110 001 101
7th 101 101 111 010 110
8th 001 100 100 000 100
Objects and social outcomes
It is easy to show that if voting is based upon the objects-scheme C =
fff1;f2;f3gg the only local optimum is the global one 011 whose basin of
attraction is the entire set X.
If instead voting is based upon the objects-scheme C = fff1g;ff2g;ff3gg
we have the appearance of multiple local optima and agenda-dependence.
If for instance the agenda is the sequence ff1g;ff2g;ff3g then 000 is the
local optimum whose basin of attraction contains half the possible initial
outcomes. For instance, if we start from 110, three out of ¯ve agents will vote
for changing the ¯rst component into a 0: 010 is in fact the best neighbour of
110 for object ff1g. Then object ff2g is considered and again the majority
(3 out of 5) decide to move to 000. Then no other change can get a majority
consensus. If instead the agenda is the sequence ff3g;ff2g;ff1g it is easy
to check that the same initial condition 110 will lead to the global optimum
011.
All in all, both multiplicity of social outcomes and agenda-dependence
appear to be linked to the speci¯c set of objects which voting is based upon.
Another property of social decision rules is the well-known voting paradox
(de Caritat Marquis de Condorcet 1785, Arrow 1951): even in the presence of
transitive individual preferences, social preferences expressed through some
voting rule may be cyclical and therefore social outcomes indeterminate. In
our model this property turns out to be dependent upon the speci¯c scheme
14of objects through which voting takes place. By appropriately modifying
objects, cycles may in fact appear or disappear holding constant the set of
social outcomes and agents' preferences. This \possibility" result may be
illustrated by means of an example which is a translation in our formalism
of the standard textbook case. Consider the case of three agents and three
objects with individual preferences expresses by the following table:
Order Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3
1st x y z
2nd y z x
3rd z x y
Cycles in social preferences
It is easy to verify that with these individual preferences, social preferences
expressed through majority rule are intransitive and cycle among the three
objects: x Â< y and y Â< z, but z Â< x.
Suppose now that x,y,z are three-components objects which we encode
according to the following mapping:
x 7! 000;y 7! 100;z 7! 010
All other combinations of components are dominated by x,y and z for all
agents and we suppose, for simplicity, that preferences over them are identical
across agents. All in all, individual preferences are given by the following
table:
Order Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3
1st 000 100 010
2nd 100 010 000
3th 010 000 100
4th 110 110 110
5th 001 001 001
6th 101 101 101
7th 011 011 011
8th 111 111 111
Objects and intransitivity: 1
It is easy to verify that if voting is based upon the unique object C =
fff1;f2;f3gg the voting process always ends up in the cycle among x,y
15and z. The same happens is each component is a separate object: Ca =
fff1g;ff2g;ff3gg.
However, if schemes Cb = fff1g;ff2;f3gg or Cd = fff1;f3g;ff2gg are
employed, voting always produces the unique global social optimum 010 in
both cases. The latter outcome is the most preferred one by agent 3, who
can therefore try to have one of these schemes adopted. All other objects-
schemes always determine cycles: the social outcomes 000 and 100 which are
the one most preferred by, respectively, agents 1 and 2 cannot be obtained as
social optima by any set of objects with this encoding. They could however
with a di®erent encoding.
Consider for instance the following encoding for x;y;z:
x 7! 100;y 7! 010;z 7! 001
and the following table of individual preferences:
Order Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3
1st 100 010 001
2nd 010 001 100
3th 001 100 010
4th 000 000 000
5th 110 110 110
6th 101 101 101
7th 011 011 011
8th 111 111 111
Objects and intransitivity: 2
Once again we obtain cycles when voting is based upon the unique object
C = fff1;f2;f3gg, if instead each component is voted as a separate object:
C = fff1g;ff2g;ff3gg we have three local optima: 100;010;001 whose basins
of attraction depend, both in size and location, upon the agenda. With the
objects-scheme C = fff1g;ff2;f3gg we have only the two local optima 100
and 010, while C = fff1;f3g;ff2gg produces the two local optima 010 and
001 and C = fff1;f3g;ff2gg produces the two local optima 100 and 001.
In section 5 we will show through simulations for populations of agents
with random preferences, that these examples can be generalized: voting
based upon large objects is very likely to produce cycles, while voting based
upon objects-schemes of smaller size is unlikely to produce cycles but on
16the other end is typically characterized by many local optima and path-
dependency.
Recall also that if jCj is the size of the objects-scheme, the number of
pairwise votes needed to ¯nd an optimum or a cycle is proportional to `jCj.
Thus small size objects render decidability more likely not only in the sense
that cycles are less likely, but also in the sense that a choice may be made in
a reasonable time. However decidability may be obtained only by increasing
manipulability, because smaller size objects highly increase the number of
locally optimal outcomes.
4 Objects and the median voter theorem
A relatively trivial consequence of the framework outlined so far is that also
the median voter theorem is weakened in a more general setting in which
objects can be modi¯ed by aggregating or disaggregating basic components.
Let us brie°y recall that the median voter theorem (Black 1958, Downs 1957),
in its stronger version, says that if there exists a median voter, his or her
most preferred outcome will always beat any other alternative in any pairwise
majority vote. Although a median voter might not exist if pairwise voting
does not converge to a unique stable outcome but produces a cycle, Duncan
Black showed that a su±cient condition for ruling out cycles is that individual
preferences are single peaked (Black 1948, Black 1958).
By applying the framework developed so far we can easily design examples
in which we do not have cycles and the median voter's most preferred policy
does indeed win a pairwise majority contest for some objects-schemes but not
for others, where, on the contrary, he or she might loose on all the objects3.
Let us provide a simple example in which this happens. Let us suppose
that some overall policy can be implemented with 8 possible levels of strength,
ranked from 0 (the nul level) to 7 (the strongest implementation level). There
are seven voters, each of whom preferring a di®erent level, with the exception
of level 0, 4 which nobody prefers. For all voters the remaining level are
ranked according to their distance from the most preferred one and in case of
3Carrillo and Castanheira (2008) also ¯nd a case in which the median voter theorem
does not hold, that is when information about the quality of candidates' platforms is not
perfect.
4We omit an agent preferring level 0 in order to have an odd number of agents and a
well de¯ned median voter.
17equal distance the higher level is preferred to the lower. All in all, individual
preferences are summarized by the following table:
Order Ag1 Ag2 Ag3 Ag4 Ag5 Ag6 Ag7
1st 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2nd 2 3 4 5 6 7 6
3rd 0 1 2 3 4 5 5
4th 3 4 5 6 7 4 4
5th 4 0 1 2 3 3 3
6th 5 5 6 7 2 2 2
7th 6 6 0 1 1 1 1
8th 7 7 7 0 0 0 0
Median voter theorem: an example I
Agent 4 is the median voter, every agent has single peaked preferences
and therefore level 4 is the unique social outcome of pairwise voting.
However let us now suppose that policy levels are codi¯ed by 3 digits
binary numbers:
Order Ag1 Ag2 Ag3 Ag4 Ag5 Ag6 Ag7
1st 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
2nd 010 011 100 101 110 111 110
3rd 000 001 010 011 100 101 101
4th 011 100 101 110 111 100 100
5th 100 000 001 010 011 011 011
6th 101 101 110 111 010 010 010
7th 110 110 000 001 001 001 001
8th 111 111 111 000 000 000 000
Median voter theorem: an example II
If voting is based upon the largest object C = fff1;f2;f3gg the unique so-
cial optimum 100, corresponding to level 4, is again always achieved. However
if each component is voted as a separate object, i.e. C = fff1g;ff2g;ff3gg
we have two local optima: one that corresponds to the median voter's most
preferred policy, i.e. 100 and the other that is exactly the opposite of the
median voter's most preferred combination of components, i.e. 011. No cy-
cles appear. Thus, with an appropriate combination of objects-schemes and
initial conditions, the median voter's inexorable \democratic dictatorship"
18can be overturned and the median voter transformed into an outright looser
of majority vote, also in the absence of any cycle.
Notice that if the number of components increases we can obtain once
again an increasing number of local optima. For instance, if we build an
analogous binary encoding example with 8 components, 256 possible social
outcomes and 255 agents, we obtain a unique social optimum 10000000, cor-
responding to the median voter's most preferred outcome, if voting is based
upon the objects-scheme C = fff1;f2;:::;f8gg; two opposite local optima
10000000 and 01111111 if the two objects ff1;f2;f3;f4g and ff5;f6;f7;f8g
are used; and two additional specular local optima, 01111011 and 10000100,
if every component is voted separately.
5 Objects and outcomes with random agents
In the previous sections we have shown that by manipulation of objects we
can modify the number and location of social optima and also act upon the
possibility that cycles emerge and the median voter dominates.
An interesting and related question is to try and measure how likely or
plausible such phenomena are, that is to ask questions like, e.g.: a) how many
local optima are we likely to encounter? b) how di®erent and/or distant from
each other are such local optima? c) how does the number and location of
local optima change with a modi¯cation of objects? d) how likely are cycles?
Such questions could be addressed either empirically by means for instance
of laboratory experiments or theoretically. In this paper we limit ourselves to
a preliminary investigation of the latter by means of computer simulations.
We simulate in fact the above described voting model for populations of
randomly generated agents, i.e. agents whose order relation over the elements
of the set X is totally random but always derived from transitive preferences.
In the ¯rst benchmark simulation we consider a set of 8 binary components
and therefore a space 256 outcomes, on which a population of 99 random
agents vote following the majority rule. All the results we present here and
below { unless otherwise speci¯ed { are averages over 1,000 repetitions of a
simulation all with the same parameters but a di®erent randomly generated
population.
We have tested the following agendas:
² ®1 = f1;2;3;4;5;6;7;8g
19² ®2 = f1;2;3;4g;f5;6;7;8g
² ®4 = f1;2g;f3;4g;f5;6g;f7;8g
² ®8 = f1g;f2g;f3g;f4g;f5g;f6g;f7g;f8g
The following table presents a summary of results:
Agenda N. of cases Average n. of N. of cases Average


















Objects, local optima and cycles
(n=8, N. agents=99, 1000 repetitions)
(¤ indicates that some cases present cycles for some initial conditions and local op-
tima for others; ¤¤ indicates that all cases present cycles for some initial conditions
and local optima for others; standard deviations in brackets)
The table shows that for the agenda ®1, that is a single object containing
all the components, we have almost always intransitive cycles and that these
cycles are rather long (almost 40 di®erent social outcomes on average). Only
in about 5% of the randomly generated populations do we obtain a social
optimum, which is obviously always achieved by voting based on ®1. All in
all, intransitive social cycles are the rule in all but a small number of cases.
If instead we take the other extreme, i.e. the agenda ®8 based on the set
of ¯nest objects, in 682 out of 1000 populations we do not observe cycles, but
voting ends in a local optimum. On average there are 15.66 local optima5
(with standard deviation 3.05). In the remaining 318 cases we observe that
5We have also carried out some simulations with 10 and 12 components, where the
number of local optima for the ¯nest objects is around 40 and around 150 respectively.
The number of local optima rapidly increases with the number of components.
20voting can end up either on a local optimum or in a cycle, depending upon
the initial condition. In particular, in those cases in which we observe cycles,
the latter are the outcome in { on average { 42.83 (with a large standard
deviation of 32.58) out of the 256 possible starting conditions. When they
appear, cycles are short, consisting on average in about 3 outcomes. All in
all, cycles are not very frequent, but on the other hand we have a considerable
number of local optima, whose selection depends upon the initial condition.
With agenda ®4 we always (all 1000 repetitions) observe the coexistence
of cycles and local optima in the same social decision problem, depending
upon the initial condition. On average, out of the 256 initial conditions,
128.85 (standard deviation 28.26) lead to a cycle and the remaining to a
local optimum. In the latter event, the average number of local optima is
9.19.
Finally, with agenda ®2 we observe 60 repetitions in which we observe only
cycles for all 256 initial conditions, whereas in the 940 remaining case cycles
appear on average for 206.53 (standard deviation 28.61) initial conditions.
The other initial conditions lead to one out of about 4 local optima. Also
in this case cycles tend to be short, as they are made on average of 4.67
outcomes.
To summarize, we observe a very clear trade-o® between the presence of
cycles and the number of local optima. When large objects are employed,
cycles are very likely to occur. The likelihood rapidly drops when ¯ner and
¯ner objects are employed, but at the same time the number of local optima
increases. This implies that a social outcome is determined (and as already
mentioned can be reached in a shorter time) but which speci¯c social outcome
strongly depends upon the speci¯c objects-scheme employed, the agenda and
the initial condition, i.e. the social outcome becomes easily manipulable by
an authority with object construction power.
We also have checked whether local optima tend to concentrate in particu-
lar parts of the space, that is if, for a single repetition of the simulation, local
optima are somehow similar, in the sense that they display at least for some
components the same value. All tests reject this hypothesis: the distribution
of local optima in the space of outcome appears as indistinguishable form a
randomly generated one.
If we decrease the number of agents we do not observe any di®erence for
the case of one object agenda ®1, while for ¯ner objects we observe a slow
increase in the number of local optima and a decrease in the frequency of
21cycles. For instance with 9 agents and the eight ¯nest objects (®8), the
number of local optima increases on average to 16.89 and cycles appear in
284 repetitions, and in those cases on average only 34 initial conditions lead
to a cycle. With only three agents the average number of local optima is
20.01 (st. dev. 3.15) and cycles appear in 176 out of 1000 repetitions, and
in the latter only for 30.52 out of 256 initial conditions. A smaller number
of agents seems therefore to reduce the likelihood of cycles.
Finally we can test what happens if we decrease the number of compo-
nents. The following table presents the results of analogous simulations with
99 agents on a \simpler" decision problem with only four components and
the three agendas:
² ®1 = ff1;2;3;4gg
² ®2 = ff1;2g;f5;6gg
² ®4 = ff1g;f2g;f3g;f4gg
Agenda N. of cases Average n. of N. of cases Average














Objects, local optima and cycles
(n=4, N. agents=99, 1000 repetitions)
(¤ indicates that some cases present cycles for some initial conditions and local
optima for others;)
Results are in line with those of the previous table. Of course we observe a
considerable decrease in the number of local optima and length of cycles due
to the vast decrease of the size of the combinatorial search space. We also
observe an overall decrease in the occurrence of cycles for all sets of objects.
226 Conclusions
Economic theory tends to reduce any act of decision to an act of choice among
given alternatives. However, often alternatives are not given exogenously
but are themselves the outcome of economic, social and political processes of
construction. Consumer choice is among products that are designed by ¯rms,
political choice is among candidates and parties that spend enormous energy
and resources in building bundles of policies to attract voters, in committees,
boards, councils and the like, those who chair them may strategically frame
and \package" choices in such a way as to obtain more favourable outcomes.
One could say that one of the fundamental role of economic, social and
political institutions is exactly the one of constructing the alternatives among
which choice is to be made, not only to provide the rules through which
choice is to be made. Abba Lerner wrote that \Economics has gained the
title of queen of the social sciences by choosing solved political problems as
its domain" (Lerner 1972, p. 259). Pre-choice object construction is, we
argue, one of the sources of political power that economics has overlooked
in the quest for a pure theory of decision making as choice. Even when
consumers, citizens and members are left totally free to choose among the
given alternatives, the authorities possessing the prerogative of building and
\giving" such alternatives may enjoy a considerable power to in°uence the
outcome of choice.
In this paper we proposed a very simple model that we see as a very
¯rst step towards a rigorous analysis of this problem. We made some strong
simplifying assumptions, we considered only the simple case of sincere ma-
jority voting, we were able to provide only examples and counter examples
and not general theorems. However we believe that the simplicity and the
constructiveness of our model helps clarifying and understanding how the
process of alternative generation may strongly in°uence the outcome of the
process of choice. Our simple model allowed us to show that by giving more
\structure" to choice, i.e. by constructing smaller objects, institutions may
avoid the indeterminacy inherent in many social choice problem, however by
doing so they increase their own power to in°uence the outcome. We also
showed that some standard results in social choice theory may be themselves
subject to manipulability through alternative construction.
Of course more general and rigorous models are needed to extend and
generalize our ¯rst results.
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